6.3.2.5  Populism in Democracies

(This is a copy of archived version 2a of this pattern.  The latest version is at https://www.patternsofpower.org/patterns/political/systems/democracy/populism/.) 

Democratic leaders have to receive votes in order to gain power, so they have an incentive to veer towards short-term populism €“ defined here as responding to people€™s expressed wishes without exercising the due diligence that is required of people who have leadership responsibilities.  This is notably a problem in economic matters:

·     Governments can offer €˜sweeteners€™ in a pre-election budget, then subsequently raise taxes.^[1]

·     They can mortgage the future by borrowing, so that they can offer unaffordable (but popular) public services; these debts, though, have to be repaid (3.3.8.1).  Austerity might subsequently be imposed as a response to a debt crisis.  This happened in Europe in 2010 for example,^[2] and the populations then protested €“ but these protests were far too late; many of the politicians who had caused the crisis had retired.

·     They can try to bribe the electorate with its own money, by offering €˜pork€™, as in examples already quoted (3.3.7.1).  It seems that those who are not the beneficiaries of the €˜pork€™ are unaware of their contribution to its cost.

·     Some tell lies about their economic plans in order to win an election, as in the 2006 example of Hungary€™s Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, who admitted to having lied.  Although riots followed, he did not resign.^[3]

Sometimes the intrinsic complexity of economics enables politicians to play such tricks without being detected, and without people understanding which policies caused economic damage (3.3.9.2). 

Such problems can be mitigated:

·     Political parties wish to retain power for prolonged periods, even though individual politicians might want to respond to short-term pressures.  A party's desire to maintain a reputation for reliability is an incentive for it not to be irresponsible; it can withdraw support from populist individuals who appear to threaten its long-term interests.

·     Some democratic systems have mature institutions which are independent from the government, such as central banks which manage inflation (3.3.8.3) and which take a long-term view.

·     Some measures to increase transparency (6.8.5.1) and accountability (6.8.5.2) are described later in this chapter. 

Whatever countermeasures are taken against populism, though, democratic politicians are more likely to resort to short-term expediency than those in authoritarian systems who wish to keep power for an indefinite period.