8.4.5        America’s Political Perspective

 (The latest version of this page is at Pattern Descriptions.  An archived copy of this page is held at https://www.patternsofpower.org/edition02/845.htm)

America’s desire for regime change in Iraq had been formally adopted as government policy with the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which was approved by Congress during the Clinton Administration.[1]  At that time, though, the emphasis was upon working with the Iraqi people to "promote the emergence of a democratic government".[2]  It reflected the neoconservative belief that a democratic Iraq would be conducive towards peace in the Middle East because liberal democracies do not make war on each other.[3]

Four years later, Bush's Cincinnati speech made no mention of working with the Iraqi people to help them to change the way that they are governed.  Instead he listed some demands, which he acknowledged were unlikely to be met, upon the Iraqi regime.  He prepared his audience for the likelihood of war – making this promise:

“If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” [4]

(Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had not, though, planned for nation-building at that time).[5]

The American people had been shocked by the 9/11 attack the previous year, and Bush's "war on terror" had been launched in response.[6]  In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002 he had characterised Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" and linked it to 9/11 as a threat to America.[7]  In his Cincinnati speech he again connected the two issues, even though there was “no evidence of formal links between Iraqi ex-leader Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda leaders prior to the 2003 war”.[8]  His reason for drawing this connection was to make the invasion of Iraq politically possible: to give Americans the impression that by invading Iraq they would be making themselves safer from terrorism.  He was seeking the political legitimacy afforded by a powerful external threat (6.3.6), capitalising on the fear created by the 9/11 attack, so he wanted to move quickly.

Other political pressures might also have been relevant:

·      As noted earlier, the oil industry had made significant donations to the Republican Party (6.4.5).  Vice-President Dick Cheney had been connected to Halliburton and the company benefited from oilfield services contracts after the invasion.

·      There was hubris in what have been referred to as "the pitfalls and risks of Cheney’s certainty", in what could be seen as an example of personality politics (6.3.4.2) when combined with Bush’s oratory, pursuing a policy based upon American global dominance:

“The primary impetus for invading Iraq…was to make an example of [Saddam] Hussein, to create a demonstration model to guide the behavior of anyone with the temerity to acquire destructive weapons or, in any way, flout the authority of the United States.”[9]

·      America’s Jewish lobby is an interest group (6.4.4); it would be expected to favour an invasion designed to neutralise the Iraqi threat against Israel, in line with the Israeli government’s support for such policies (8.3.4).

It is hard to determine the significance of these pressures, but it is equally hard to completely dismiss them. 

© PatternsofPower.org, 2014