6.7.4.2  Ethnicity as a Basis for Divisiveness: Identity Politics

(This is an archived extract from the book Patterns of Power: Edition 2)

Pluralism is not just about recent immigrants; in many countries there are minority ethnic groups which have been established for generations.  People might not usually feel that their ethnicity is very significant, but they will seek solidarity with others in the same group if they perceive threats (4.4.5.1).  Some politicians try to exploit this phenomenon (4.4.5.2), resulting in what is termed  ‘identity politics’ in this book.

There is no fundamental reason why opinions on tax and the provision of public services, for example, should be in any way affected by what ethnic group a person belongs to – so it can be argued that ethnicity need not be a major factor in most political negotiations and therefore doesn’t need any form of structural recognition. 

In mature democracies with ‘first past the post’ systems of representation (6.3.2.4), such as Britain, America and France, the political parties are formed primarily to offer different political ideologies and policies; the act of voting is then a way of participating in ‘joystick politics’ (6.2.6).  But if the political parties are based upon ethnic identity – either in an immature democracy or in an established system with proportional representation that allows many small parties – people may vote according to their ethnicity.  This creates problems:

·      The political system becomes focused on negotiation by proxy between ethnic groups; ‘joystick’ politics ceases to be possible.

·      If there has been a history of conflict and lack of trust between ethnic groups they have no good basis for negotiating policy – they tend to posture and jockey for position rather than focus upon the need to find collective solutions to the country’s problems.[1]

Voting on the basis of ethnicity offers people the safety valve of knowing that their cultural identity is visible, but it has the disadvantage of potentially exacerbating divisiveness by incentivising politicians to emphasise differences or 'play the race card'. 

Even if there are no recognised ethnic political parties as such, there are several tactical techniques which politicians commonly use to stimulate people’s sense of identity as a means of gaining support:

·      Hostility towards immigrants can form the basis of a politician's attempt to win support from the existing inhabitants of an area, by exploiting a number of issues:

‒      Immigrants are (wrongly) seen as taking jobs and threatening people's employment (3.4.3.3).

‒      As noted in the previous section (6.7.4.1), social services may find it difficult to accommodate them.

‒      Immigrants can be demonised as a threat to national identity, as suggested by the British National Party in its 2010 election manifesto, for example.[2]

·      Leaders can proclaim threats to a group’s freedom, status or security.  Jinnah stimulated such fears among Muslims in India, for example, as Britain was granting it independence; his "Direct Action Day" against the Hindu majority, in August 1946, resulted in 4,000 deaths and 10,000 people injured in Calcutta.[3]

·      Religious labels can be attached to existing political movements.  The political desire for a united Ireland, for example, acquired a religious dimension when Ian Paisley fanned the flames of anti-Catholic feeling,[4] and Protestants exercised discrimination against Catholics in council employment and in the allocation of council housing.[5]  The society was then polarised along religious lines, and terrorism emerged on both sides of the sectarian divide. 

·      Appeals to national identity can be used to mobilise people to take revenge for, or to ‘correct’, a past injustice.  Serbia’s invasion of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, for example, was politically linked to a desire to reverse its defeat in 1389 by the Ottoman Turks.[6]

·      Old religious disputes can be similarly re-awakened for political purposes.  For example, in 1992 the Hindu nationalist BJP argued that the 16th-century Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya had been built on the birthplace of the Hindu god-king Ram; this whipped up a frenzy of anti-Muslim feeling which resulted in the destruction of the mosque.  2,000 people died in the ensuing violence.[7]

·      Acts of political provocation can make a group feel good at the expense of its opponents.  The annual Orange marches in Northern Ireland are clearly provocative; they stir up resentment in the Catholic community and riots regularly ensue.[8] 

As shown in several of these examples, identity politics can easily escalate to violence.  Large-scale dissent can lead to separatism (6.6.3). 

An authoritarian government has two advantages, compared to a democracy, in reducing the risk of identity politics:

·      Politicians in an authoritarian system are less dependent upon short-term popularity, so they have less motivation to 'play the race card'.

·      There are no political mechanisms for one group to gain ascendancy over another, so it is less tempting to indulge in identity politics.

These arguments do not in themselves constitute a reason for preferring authoritarianism as a system, but they can contribute to the legitimacy of authoritarian governments in countries where there would otherwise be a risk of identity politics.

© PatternsofPower.org, 2014