(This is an archived extract from the book Patterns of Power: Edition 2)
Terrorism is defined here simply as the use of violence to intimidate people, in order to reach a political objective.[1] Earlier mentions of it in this book referred to campaigns within or against a single State; they were treated as law-enforcement issues (5.2.5), which in some cases escalate to the point where a State needs to use military force in Self-Protection (7.2.6). International terrorism, by contrast, is defined in this book as a campaign waged by non-State actors operating in several countries; it requires a different kind of response – no single country can bring it to an end, either by force or by negotiation.
The most striking example to date is Al-Qaeda’s global jihad against "the Americans and their allies", although it is possible to imagine other causes, such as the anti-capitalism movement, trying to follow a similar path. Osama bin Laden, in launching the jihad, described it as a ‘just war’ and sought to gain the support of all Muslims.[2] Many Muslims disagree with his views, but Al-Qaeda has nonetheless been able to absorb and re-brand numerous local conflicts to create a “global Islamist insurgency” (where the term ‘Islamist’ describes the extremist, radical form of political Islam).[3]
International terrorism is Hydra-headed: when leaders are killed others spring up to replace them. If it is driven out of one place it can simply move to another. A war cannot, therefore, remove the risk it presents. The 'war against terrorism' is a misnomer and a fatally flawed conception. The sweeping powers granted to the American president,[4] for the use of military force in any country deemed to have been involved with Al-Qaeda, presuppose that the enemy is a single organisation and that military force is an appropriate solution.
Technology has increased the threat posed by Al-Qaeda:
· Al-Qaeda has been able to use the Internet to communicate with numerous cells of activity: providing propaganda, training materials, guidance and coordination.
· Terrorists may hack into computers to gain access to secret information about targets.
· They may also gain access to the knowledge to make weapons of mass destruction.
· The Internet enables them to pool their knowledge and to innovate rapidly.
The implications of these capabilities are so serious that the whole approach to international security needs to be re-examined.[5] Collaborative policing and the sharing of intelligence will be necessary to ensure that governments are at least as agile as those who oppose them.
Counter-terrorism actions, although they are essential, can only address the symptoms of underlying problems. As David Kilcullen pointed out, the global insurgency has absorbed several problems which have been festering for a long time and which could be separately addressed by each of the States concerned.[6] He proposed a policy of "disaggregation", which would operate at two levels:
· It would provide a realistic political path towards resolution of the problems in each country.
· It would marginalise a jihad whose aims have nothing to do with those problems.
It should be possible to win a war of words with Al-Qaeda, because it is killing innocent people and there are many Muslim leaders who disagree with its approach, but the long-term solutions would come from each of the country-specific negotiations. The existence of meaningful negotiations in a country should de-legitimise terrorism there.
In parallel, it is advisable to ensure that Al-Qaeda isn’t provided with any further evidence to support its assertion that it is waging a 'just war'. The Quran recognises the Golden Rule (4.2.2.2), and it urges “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (4.4.4.1), but it does permit the use of force to defend Islam;[7] it is therefore important that actions against terrorists should not be capable of being construed as attacks against Islam as a religion.
© PatternsofPower.org, 2014
[1] The simple definition of terrorism used in this book is merely intended to distinguish it from (a) military confrontations between States, and (b) violence used directly in the course of non-political crime. In his book Terrorism: How to Respond, Richard English devotes the whole of chapter 1 to the problem of trying to define terrorism unambiguously.
[2] Alia Brahimi, in her book Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror, described Osama bin Laden’s strategy for justifying his jihad (on page 2):
“Osama bin Laden, who sets himself up as an Islamic authority, has sought to portray his jihad as an individual duty conferred by Islam and incumbent upon all Muslims.”
“….Osama bin Laden confidently employed Quranic verses in support of his commands to ‘kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military’.”
She also pointed out his views are contested, and that many influential Muslims criticised the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 as non-Islamic. The book’s Introduction was available in May 2014 at http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199562961.do.
[3] David Kilcullen published an article entitled Countering Global Insurgency, which was published in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 597-617, August 2005. This article describes Al-Qaeda’s structure and aims, and it argues that “This globalised jihad network is best understood as an insurgency.” (p. 5). The article was available in May 2014 on several web-sites, including http://www.socsci.uci.edu/files/internationalstudies/docs/counterinsurgency20101007.
Mary Habeck, in a Templeton lecture on religion and world affairs, pointed out that Al Qaeda has articulated a "grand strategy" to create a caliphate which would encompass all the parts of the world which were previously parts of Muslim empires, and which would enforce a particular interpretation of Shariah law. She compared this quest for purity with Hitler's Nazi ideals. The text of the lecture was available in an article entitled Attacking America: Al Qaeda’s Grand Strategy in Its War with the World, which was available in May 2014 at http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/02/attacking-america-al-qaedas-grand-strategy-its-war-world.
[4] The ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force’, S.J. Res. 23 (107th), on 18 September 2001, gave the US President the authority
“…to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
The text was available in May 2014 at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/sjres23/text.
[5] T.J. Rowntree’s paper in July 2008, entitled Is globalisation undermining the military capability of the nation state – and does it matter?, explores the problems presented by the increasing sophistication of international terrorism (section 49 ff.). It was available in May 2014 at http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/.../shp08rowntree.pdf
[6] David Kilcullen’s article entitled Countering Global Insurgency, referred to above, includes a section entitled “Strategy of Disaggregation”.
[7] Reza Aslan, in his book No god but God (p. 84), describes the Quran's position on jihad, saying "the doctrine of jihad was its outright prohibition of all but strictly defensive wars" and quoting the Quran (in his own translation):
"do not begin hostilities; God does not like the aggressor" (2:190);
"permission to fight is given only to those who have been oppressed" (22:39).
He argues that other passages in the Quran (9:5, 9:73 and 9:29), which appear to give a more general permission to fight, were specific to Islam's early war for survival against the Quraysh (a group of polytheists or ‘Pagans’); his interpretation is borne out by the opening verse of this Sura: “A (declaration) of immunity From God and His Apostle, To those of the Pagans With whom ye have contracted Mutual alliances:--“.