The term ‘tactical agreement’ in this context describes one which has been negotiated outside the framework of international law – which means that it lacks the resilience that a legal framework can provide (5.3.6). Such deals are agreed by the countries involved, as attempts at self-protection. They can be brought into the framework of international law at a later date, if disputes are referred to the International Court of Justice, but that depends on mutual consent. Parties can otherwise walk away from tactical agreements and peace treaties if they choose to do so.
· Countries can form ad hoc alliances or coalitions to combat perceived military threats. These are negotiated politically, as described earlier (6.6.6.3), and the trade between them has an economic impact (3.5.4.5).
· Parties can sign treaties, for example to resolve a border dispute, without choosing an external arbitration authority. Renegotiation, withdrawal, or the threat of force are the only means of rectifying breaches of such treaties.
As described previously (7.2.7.1), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a major formal international alliance that is working to resist western hegemony. Several non-member countries work with it on a tactical basis, as ‘dialogue partners’ - including Egypt, Kuwait, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 9 others as at August 2024. These relationships can blunt the effectiveness of western sanctions against Russia for example.
Hal Brands described how North Korea, for example, takes advantage of The New Autocratic Alliances:
“In Russia’s long-standing relationships with Pyongyang and Tehran, aid and influence now flow both ways. China is drawing closer to Iran, to complement its decades-old alliance with North Korea. For years, Pyongyang and Tehran have collaborated to make missiles and mischief. This isn’t a single revisionist coalition. It is a more complex web of ties among autocratic powers that aim to reorder their regions and, thereby, reorder the world.”
The AUKUS alliance is an agreement which “will let Australia build nuclear-powered submarines for the first time, using technology provided by the US”. It was announced in September 2021 – as described by the BBC: Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China.
The same article also refers to the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, which includes New Zealand and Canada who are not in AUKUS – further illustrating the tactical nature of such groupings.
Another example of a western ad hoc alliance is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) which revived in March 2021, after a long pause, with the Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”. It opened with this statement:
“We have convened to reaffirm our commitment to quadrilateral cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.”
· The article America's Bad Bet on India described how the Indian government draws what it can from its relationship with America but avoids alienating China: “New Delhi Won’t Side With Washington Against Beijing”. India is a member of the SCO.
· Hungary is similarly ambivalent: it is a member of NATO and the EU, but Putin and Orban reaffirm Russian-Hungarian ties amid international strains.
· And Turkey is a member of NATO, but it is also a ‘dialogue partner’ of the SCO.
There is a crucial difference between limited tactical agreements and peace treaties. The signatories to a peace treaty might hope that it will endure. It often doesn't, though. This is illustrated by some examples involving NATO, Russia, and Ukraine:
· The Budapest memorandum, signed by America, Britain, Russia and Ukraine in December 1994, gave a commitment “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine”. Those three major powers also affirmed “their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of Ukraine”. Russia violated that by annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in February 2022.
· Several attempts were made to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea. A BBC article, Leaders urge implementation of Minsk peace deal in 2016, describes how repeated ceasefires were broken and the conflict continued.
· NATO and Russia signed a joint declaration in the 2002 Rome summit: “NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest”. America invaded Iraq in 2003, though, despite a veto by Russia.
These examples illustrate the inherent fragility of peace deals reached without an enforcing power. As a contrasting example, the 1995 Dayton Accord put an end to a “three-and-a-half years of war in the Balkans”. NATO peacekeepers were put in to enforce it, replaced by an EU peacekeeping force in 2004. These peacekeepers, though, were not able to bring sufficient force to prevent violence, as described later (7.4.4).
From this analysis, it follows that Ukraine would not want to accept any peace settlement that came without NATO membership. Only on that basis could any loss of territory be justified, because only then could Russia be prevented from coming back later for more. And a speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg included a willingness for this to happen: “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”.
(This is an archive of a page intended to form part of Edition 4 of the Patterns of Power series of books. The latest versions are at book contents).